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Will it be we, the women living in the Muslim city, who will pay the
price ... ? Will we be sacrificed for community security in the
coming rituals to be performed by all those who are afraid to raise
the real problem-the problem of individualism and responsibility,
both sexual and political?1
[W]e do not accept-and we will not accept-the concept of a
single parent family or the concept of a family in its plurality of
forms.... Single parent family means a woman without a legal
husband with a child without a legal father.2
As women are gradually becoming more visible in public life, and
are breaking the bonds of patriarchal control, they are also facing a
backlash articulated in terms of the reassertion of cultural, traditional,
and religious values. In the ensuing struggle over women's rights,
rival interpretations of Muslim laws, reformist and anti-reformist, are
enlisted by each of the parties for their own aid. What is forgotten in
the process, however, are women's own experiences, and the struggle
to bring those experiences to bear on the formulation of standards by
which to secure women's rights.
* Associate, Research Division, The Population Council, New York.
** Associate in the law firm of Dr. Kamal Hossain and Associates, Dhaka, Bangladesh, and
a member of Ain o Shalish Kendra, a legal resources and human rights center in Dhaka.
1. FATIMA MERNISsI, IsLAM AND DEMOCRACY: FEAR OF TME MODERN WORLD 9 (1993).
2. Abdur Razzaq, Keynote Paper Presented at the Seminar on the Cairo Conference on
Population and Development: Human Rights and Moral Issues, Held by the Center for Human
Rights in Dhaka, Bangladesh (Sept. 9, 1994).
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This Paper first attempts to elaborate the meaning of reproductive
rights, as defined in international human rights law and elaborated in
the recent Cairo Conference. It also outlines the provisions of the
Bangladesh Constitution, which provides a legal foundation for
reproductive rights, and the extent to which such rights are articulat-
ed by health and women's rights advocates. A brief description of the
legal framework for the family planning program in Bangladesh is
followed by an outline of the history of the program. This Paper
argues that, in the context of a strong state-supported program for
family planning which has made contraception widely available to
married women in all parts of Bangladesh, there is not much evidence
of specific religious opposition to the use of contraception or even to
menstrual regulation.
This Paper considers the extent to which religious laws can be used,
not merely to further the goals of family planning programs, but also
to secure women's reproductive rights and freedoms. Although
Muslim laws offer progressive interpretations supporting family
planning, which have formed the base for a functioning family
planning program in Bangladesh, fundamentalists' have sought to
impose more restrictive interpretations upon society. Fundamentalists
assert a monolithic and repressive version of Islam that, through the
force of law, provides for the subordination and control of women,
and in particular, women's sexual and reproductive rights. The Paper
briefly discusses the fundamentalism in Bangladesh and the use by
fundamentalists of both restrictive interpretations and misinterpreta-
tions of religious law to violate women's fundamental rights to
reproductive freedom, security, and health. While remaining, for the
moment, politically marginal, fundamentalists have been able, by their
increasing denunciations of both women who transgress social norms,
and the agencies that enable them to do so, to create situations in
which acts of extreme violence have been perpetuated against women
perceived as having breached religious sanctions.
Because such attacks on women appear to be politically rather than
religiously motivated, any response based solely on a spirit of cultural
relativism fails to address the issue. In order to establish women's
rights to reproductive freedoms, it is necessary to anchor the rights
3. Note that while the fundamentalist phenomenon is manifested today in all religions,
in Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam, in this Paper the term is used primarily with
reference to fundamentalist activities in Bangladesh, and thus to Muslim fundamentalists. On
fundamentalism and women's struggles, see Marie Aimee Helie Lucas, Women's Struggles and
Strategies in the Rise of Fundamentalism in the Muslim World: From Entryism to Internationalism, in
WOMEN AND STRUGGLES FOR LIBERATION 206 (1993).
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within an appropriate framework. This framework must take into
account not only Islam and Muslim laws, and their varying interpreta-
tions, but also the specific cultural and political context of any society.
Most importantly, it must be based on a bedrock of universal human
rights standards.
THE CONTENT OF WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW4
Of the international human rights instruments to which the
Government of Bangladesh is party, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights5 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (Women's Convention)6 are
preeminent in protecting reproductive rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the right to
life, liberty, and security of person.7 Both the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the Women's Convention guarantee the right
to sexual nondiscrimination.8 The obligation to eliminate discrimina-
tion against women is specifically stated in the Women's Convention
to include the obligation to "take all appropriate measures ... to
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against women"9 and "to modify the
social and cultural patterns and conduct of men and women. . . with
a view to elimination of... customary and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the
sexes or stereotyped roles of men and women."'"
The right to marry and found a family is provided by both the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and the Women's Conven-
4. For an overview of international human rights law and reproductive rights, see REBECCA
J. COot, WOMEN'S HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (World Health Organization 1994).
5. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra doc. biblio.
6. See Women's Convention, infra doc. biblio. Bangladesh's ratification of the Women's
Convention is subject to a reservation to Articles 2, 13(a), and 16.1(c) and (f) on the grounds
that these provisions are in "conflict with Sharia law based on the Holy Quaran and Sunna."
Fifth Meeting of the States Parties, Notes of the Secretary General on Reservations, at 30, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/SP/13/rev. For a discussion of Bangladesh's reservations to the Women's
Convention, see Sara Hossaln, Equality in the Home: Women's Rights and Personal Laws in South
Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPErIVES (Rebecca J.
Cook ed., 1994).
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra doc. biblio., art. 3.
8. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra doc. biblio., art 2.; Women's
Convention, infra doc. biblio., arts. 1, 3.
9. Women's Convention, infra doc. biblio., art. 2.
10. Women's Convention, infra doc. biblio., art. 5.
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, infra doc. biblio., art. 16.1.
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tion.1 2  The Women's Convention moves beyond the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other earlier human rights
conventions, in its explications of the right to health with respect to
family planning. In Article 10, it provides for the right of access to
educational information, "including information and advice on family
planning."3 It imposes upon States Parties the obligation to "take
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination... to ensure access
to health care services including those relating to family planning,"14
in particular to ensure that women in rural areas "have access to
adequate health care facilities, including information, counselling and
services in family planning."" In addition, the Women's Convention
guarantees the right "to decide freely and responsibly on the number
and spacing of... children" and "to have access to the information,
education and means to enable them to exercise these rights."16
THE CAIRo CONFERENCE
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Women's
Convention comprise part of the essential foundations in internation-
al law for reproductive rights, the enforcement of these rights is
dependent in effect upon the States Parties to these instruments. The
Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population
and Development (ICPD Programme of Action),17 held in Cairo in
1994, and adopted by over 180 countries, is the first U.N. population
policy document that endorses a range of rights applicable to
women's reproductive health and security, and recommends that
national population policies respect international human rights
norms.
18
In the face of organized religious opposition, the Cairo Conference
was able to adopt a Programme of Action that emphasizes that
women's empowerment is "an end in itself' 9 and brought the
notion of reproductive health to the center of population policy. 2
12. Women's Convention, infra doc. biblio., art. 16.1.
13. Women's Convention, infra doc. biblio., art. 10.
14. Women's Convention, infra doc. biblo., art. 12.1.
15. Women's Convention, infra doc. biblio., art. 14.2.
16. Women's Convention, infra doc. biblio., art. 16.1.
17. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. biblio.
18. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. biblio. For stronger formulations of reproductive
rights by women's rights activists, see also Report of the International Women's Health
Conference for Cairo 1994, Reproductive Health andJustice, organized by International Women's
Health Coalition (1WHC) & Cidadania, Estudos, Pesquisa, Infornmacao, Acao (CEPIA) Uan. 24-
28, 1994).
19. 1CPD Programme of Action, infra doc. biblio., art. 4.1.
20. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. biblo., art. 7.2.
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It virtually adopts the World Health Organization's definition of
reproductive health, as follows:
[A] state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not
merely the absence of disease and infirmity, in all matters relating
to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes.
Reproductive health, therefore, implies that people are able to have
a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to
reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to
do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and
women to be informed and to have access to safe, effective,
affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their
choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of
fertility which are not against the law, and the right of access to
appropriate health-care services that will enable women to go safely
through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the
best chance of having a healthy infant. In line with the above
definition of reproductive health, reproductive health care is
defined as the constellation of methods, techniques and services
that contribute to reproductive health and well being through
preventing and solving reproductive health problems. It also
includes sexual health, the purposes of which is the enhancement
of life and personal relations, and not merely counselling and care
related to reproduction and sexually transmitted diseases.
The ICPD Programme of Action recognizes "reproductive rights"
and includes within this term the "right of all to make decisions
concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and
violence as expressed in human rights documents"2' and emphasizes
the need for informed choice in family planning programs.22 It
urges governments to provide reproductive health-related services,"
and to "deal with the health impact of unsafe abortions."24 The
document repeatedly stresses the importance of giving attention to
the "reproductive health needs of female adolescents and young
women."2
ARTICULATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN BANGLADESH
The Constitution of Bangladesh of 1972, guarantees the right to life
and personal liberty,26 to equality under the law,27 to nondiscrimi-
21. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. biblio., art. 7.3.
22. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. biblio., art. 7.12.
23. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. bibho., art. 7.6.
24. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. bib!io., art. 8.25.
25. ICPD Programme of Action, infra doc. bib/io., arts. 7.3, 8.19.
26. BANGL. CONST. of 1972, art. 32.
27. Id. art. 27.
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nation on the ground of sex, 28 and to equal protection of the law.29
It provides the right to freedom from torture, and from cruel, degrad-
ing, or inhuman punishment." The Constitution further provides,
subject to "reasonable restrictions," the right to freedom of associa-
tion 3' and freedom of thought, conscience, speech, and expres-
sion 2 Included among the Fundamental Principles of State Policy,
in Chapter II of the Constitution, is an obligation upon the State to
take all measures to ensure the right to health and education of all
citizens.3
In spite of these constitutional provisions, to the extent that there
is any articulation of reproductive rights in Bangladesh, it is focused
on the right to health and derived from the principle that access to
health and freedom from disease are basic needs.34  The family
planning program, instituted to meet demographic goals of reducing
population growth, has been the principal source of contraception for
women. Contraceptives are readily available at little or no cost to
women all over the country. Denial of access to contraception,
therefore, is not perceived, at least by married women, as a major
problem. In these circumstances, rather than criticizing the availabili-
ty of contraception, women's groups have frequently criticized the
family planning program for its overzealous commitment to increasing
contraceptive prevalence for fertility control, because the program
diverts attention from meeting the full range of women's reproductive
health needs. Demographically driven programs are accused of
treating women as objects and a means towards achieving population
control objectives. 5
It is not surprising, therefore, that women's demands for reproduc-
tive health services are voiced in terms of freedom from violence,
coercion, and inappropriate use of reproductive technology. The
equally important focus on women's needs in positive terms such as
better access to health services, better quality services, more diverse
health services, and services for health needs other than for fertility
control, receives less attention. Again, there are few attempts to
explicitly articulate the notion of the right to reproductive health or
28. Id. art 28.
29. Id. art. 31.
30. Id. art. 35(4).
31. Id. art. 38.
32. Id. art. 39.
33. Id. ch. II.
34. Bangladesh NGO Preparatory Committee for Beijing Conference, Draft Report
Prepared for the Fourth World Women's Conference (1995).
35. Unnoyon Bikolpo o Niti Gobeshona (UBINIG) [Alternative Development and Policy
Research), People's Perspective on "Population," Report of the International Symposium (1993).
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freedom, including the right to reproductive self-determination.
Women's groups in Bangladesh have largely remained conspicuously
silent on the issue of sexuality. This silence exists despite highly
publicized events of extremely grave violations of women's rights.
These violations have not directly infringed on access to the means of
reproductive control, but instead, involved digressions from socially
acceptable sexual practices."
LEGAL BASIS OF FAMILY PLANNING
All family planning services, other than abortion, are legal as long
as they are not explicitly prohibited. Access to such services is deter-
mined by the relevant authorities in the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare. Periodic circulars, issued by the Directorate of Family
Planning and Health, specify policies of dissemination. By social
consensus, contraception and related services are only provided to
married women.
Access to abortion services is the only area in which there is a major
legal impediment. Abortion, except to save the life of the woman, is
a criminal offence in Bangladesh under section 312 of the Penal Code
1860, which states:
Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall,
if such miscarriage is not caused in good faith for the purpose of
saving the life of the woman, be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to 3 years or with
fine or both; ... and if a woman is quick with child, then the
person causing the woman to miscarry shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description of a term which may extend to
7 years and shall also be liable to fine. 7
Despite these criminal provisions, abortion during the first trimester
is widely practiced under the name of Menstrual Regulation (MR).
MR services, which have been provided at government facilities since
being introduced as a component of the Government's family
planning program in the late 1970s, were initially justified as
preventing botched abortions and consequent maternal mortality.
Menstrual Regulation finds its legal basis in an interpretation by the
Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs that views MR
as "an interim method to establish non-pregnancy," effectively
removing it from the purview of the Penal Code when pregnancy is
86. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing Dulali's and Shopnahar's cases).
37. 1 BANGL PENAL CODE OF 1860 § 312.
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not established. 8 MR services are widely available and provided at
government health facilities free of cost by government functionaries
who receive high quality training and safe MR kits from the Govern-
ment.
3 9
Despite the widespread practice of MR, the criminal status of
abortion undoubtedly contributes to the current moral ambiguity of
the practice. In most rural contexts, MR/abortions are carried out
secretly, because the woman obtaining the abortion and anyone
known to have facilitated the process may face serious repercussions,
including social sanctions. Although there are no reported court
decisions regarding prosecutions for abortion, if a situation involving
MR/abortion is exposed, it may be heard before informal village
tribunals (shalish), in particular if the abortion is the product of an
illicit relationship or adultery.
For example, in a recent study, two cases involving abortion came
up for shalish hearing in a particular village. Both were instances of
extramarital relationships that resulted in pregnancy and abortion.
The shalish gave the same judgment in both instances. The male
partner was ordered to compensate the female partner approximately
Taka 5000 (U.S. $125) for sexual violation. In addition, in one case,
the person who facilitated the abortion by accompanying the woman
to the health center was fined a small amount (Taka 200 = U.S.
$5).' 0 Thus, the act of extramarital sex, rather than the abortion
itself, appeared to constitute an offense.
HISTORY OF THE FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM
The main objective of population policy in Bangladesh is reduced
population growth. Family planning services are seen as the means
by which to attain this objective. Although a family planning program
has been in place in Bangladesh since the 1960s, the program has
evolved in significant ways in response to changes in policy. In the
former Pakistan, family planning programs wrongly assumed that the
population problem could be addressed by flooding markets with
contraception; media campaigns were simple but largely ineffective.
The philosophy of the population campaign was expressed succinctly
in the promotional message "Chhoto Poribar Shukhi Poriba9' ("A small
38. See M.S. Ali et al., Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, Report on
Legal Aspects of Population Planning 31 (1978).
39. See Ruth Dixon-Mueller, Innovations in Reproductive Health Care: Menstrual Regulation
Policies and Programs in Bangladesh, 19 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 129 (1988).
40. Sajeda Amin, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Study on Family Structure
and Change in Rural Bangladesh (1992) (fieldnotes from village study).
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family is a happy family"). In hindsight, the program has been
described as ill-planned and ill-managed, and the media campaign
uninformed. It is now generally accepted that the Bangladesh family
planning program became effective in reaching its contraceptive
acceptance goals only after radical changes were made in the late
1970s.
The Bangladesh Government declared population its number-one
problem in 1976,41 and combined an elaborate family planning
program with a strong motivational campaign, which has been backed
by extensive external financial support. The program emphasizes
access to contraceptive services and delivers them at the doorstep of
women even in remote rural areas. The communication and
motivation strategy is also strongly reinforced by "Malthusian
pressure"; people from all walks of life are acutely aware of the
spectre of the population bomb.
From its inception, the family planning program has been the focus
of extensive research and writing. Early writings were primarily
concerned with discovering the reasons for nonuse of contraception
and motivations for high fertility. There was a notable absence of any
reference of specific religious opposition to contraception, but the
literature cited numerous other cultural and economic rationales for
high fertility. There is, however, anecdotal evidence that religious
leaders voiced early opposition to specific family planning methods,
such as sterilization and IUD, in religious terms. For instance, women
who refused an IUD insertion or sterilization would cite a threat of
being denied a proper burial by local imams. In response, special
efforts were made by the family planning program to increase
knowledge and acceptability of specific methods among religious
leaders, including special programs for training imams.
RISING CONTRACEPTiVE PREVALENCE IN BANGLADESH
Bangladesh has been noted for the very rapid rise in contraceptive
use that has occurred over a relatively short period. Most demogra-
phers attribute the rapidly changing fertility profile that has accompa-
nied rising contraception to an aggressive family planning program.
A recent analysis identified the following critical changes in the
program as reasons for its success in increasing contraceptive use:
(1) Introduction of doorstep delivery of services to women by
24,000 family planning frontline workers;
41. M. Badrud Duza, Overview ofindings, in SOUTH ASIA STUDY OF POPULATION POLICYAND
PROGRAMmS: BANGLADESH (M. Badrud Duza ed., 1990).
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(2) Introduction of more culturally appropriate and intensive
education propaganda campaigns, including radio and television,
as well as many other channels of communication, such as face-to-
face motivation by workers. Messages address issues such as the
environmental impact of population growth, social responsibility,
preference for sons, the benefit of contraceptive use for women's
health, and child survival;
(3) Increased efforts to enhance the credibility of family planning
workers by providing them with the resources to also perform some
health care work, particularly for mothers and young children; and
(4) Provision of curative and preventive medical services to
children in family welfare centers which previously provided only
family planning services - a strategy referred to as the Maternal
and Child Health-based family planning.42
According to nationally representative Contraceptive Prevalence
Surveys carried out among currently married women of reproductive
age, the use of modern contraceptives rose from 7.7% in 1975 to 30%
in 1989 and 45% in 1993. This trend is illustrated by Table 1 below.
Thus, access to contraception went from being available to less than
ten percent of married women to being available for nearly half of
the relevant population.
These aggregate data have been corroborated by data from smaller
scale studies that also show similar levels of contraceptive use among
currently married women.' Several of these specialized studies have
also shown that contraceptive use is even higher among women who
participate in credit schemes meant to give women independent
access to cash and income.
42. JOHN CLELAND r AL., WORLD BANK, REPRODUCTIVE CHANGE IN BANGLADESH: SUCCESS
IN A CHALLENGING ENvIRONMENT (1994).
43. See Sydney Schuler & Syed M. Hashemi, Credit Programs, Women's Empowerment, and
Contraceptive Use in Rural Bangadesh, 25 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 65 (1994); Simeen Mahmud, The Role
of Women's Employment Programs in Influencing Fertility Regulation in Rural Bangladesh
(paper presented at the Population Association of American, Cincinnati, Ohio 1993).
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TABLE 1: CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN BANGLADESH BY TYPE OF METHOD
FROM CONTRACEPTIVE
MARRIED WOMEN4 4
PREVALENCE SURVEYS AMONG CURRENTLY
1995] 1329
Contraceptive 1975 1983 1986 1989 1991 1993
MethodI II
Pill 2.7 3.3 5.1 9.1 13.9 17.4
IUD 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.2
Injectibles - 0.2 0.5 1.1 2.6 4.5
Condom 0.7 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.5 3.0
Female 0.3 6.2 7.9 9.0 9.1 8.1
Sterilization
Male 0.5 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.1
Sterilization
Safe Period 1.0 2.4 3.8 3.8 4.7 4.8
Withdrawal 0.6 1.3 0.9 1.2 2.0 2.5
Other 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.1
Methods
All Methods 7.7 19.1 25.3 31.4 39.9 44.6
The increased use of contraception is most often attributed to the
greater awareness among NGO members and gainfully employed
women about the availability of services. Their connections with the
world beyond the bari (homestead) also gives them greater exposure
to government programs and messages that promote the use of family
planning. Most NGOs incorporate some element of motivation for
family planning in their educational messages.
Large scale national credit programs such as those run by the
Grameen Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee,'
and several NGOs show that contraceptive use is considerably higher
among women who belong to programs to receive credit to engage
44. S.N. Mitra et al., Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey, 1993-94. Preliminary Repor,
in DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEyS (S.N. Mitra et al. eds., 1994).
45. Both organizations provide small scale credit to rural women belonging to credit
groups, comprised only of the poor.
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in small businesses, compared to women with similar backgrounds
who do not participate in such programs. This data is set out in
Table 2.
TABLE 2: MODERN CONTRACEPTION AMONG PROGRAM MEMBERS AND
NONMEMBERS OF WOMEN'S CREDIT PROGRAMS46
Study Description % of credit % of
recipients nonrecipients
using of similar
contraception group using
contraception
Schuler & Hashemi
Grameen Bank Members 0.54 0.43
Survey date: 1991
Mahmud 4 8
BRAC, Grameen, and BRDB 0.56 0.41
members
Survey date: 1989
Kabir & Rahman49
Several credit program 0.67 0
members
Survey date: None
RELIGIosrlY AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE
A recent analysis of factors that affect women's contraceptive use
shows that religiosity (as measured by both the frequency with which
women pray and self-assessment) is not statistically associated with use
of modem reversible contraceptives." This is a carefully conducted
statistical analysis that controls for the simultaneous impact of other
46. See Michael H. Bernhart & M. Mosleh Uddin, Islam and Family Planning Acceptance in
Bangladesh, 21 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 287 (1990).
47. See Schuler & Hashemi, supra note 43.
48. See Mahmud, supra note 43.
49. See Mohammad Kabir & Bazlur Rahmen, Rural Poverty and Demographic Change:
Evidence from Village-Based Women in Development Programs (1994) (paper presented at
IUSSP Seminar on Women, Poverty and Demographic Change, Oaxaca, Mex.).
50. Nashid Kamel & Andrew Sloggett, National Institute of Population Research and
Training (NIPORT), The Influence of Religiosity, Mobility and Decirio Making on Contraceptive Use.
in BANGLADESH FERTnrrY SuRVEY, 1989: SECONDARY ANALYSIS (John Cleland et al. eds., 1993).
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socioeconomic factors that may be related to religiosity. At least two
other studies have also concluded that Islamic religious beliefs are not
important or significant barriers to modem contraceptive use in
Bangladesh.5
The first study, referred to above, however, indicates that religious
fervor affects the decision to adopt sterilization as a contraceptive
method. In other words, women who report themselves as most
religious are less likely to use sterilization as a method of contracep-
tion. This finding is consistent with our general impression of
differential legitimacy of various forms of contraception. Female
sterilization, for example, has always faced the most severe opposition,
primarily because doctors who perform the procedure are very often
men. Sterilization, therefore, is perceived as a violation of the rules
of seclusion that prohibit women's contact with nonkin. It is perhaps
also relevant that the survey on which this analysis is based was carried
out at a time of declining sterilizations. This decline is attributable
to a withdrawal of donor support, which in turn led to weaker
motivational campaigns for sterilization as a method of contracep-
tion.52
Although at the individual level women's religiosity does not appear
to affect their decision to adopt modem contraception, a
community's religiosity may indirectly affect the level of contraceptive
use. There is a strong regional pattern in contraceptive use, which
indicates, for example, that the more conservative Chittagong region
of Bangladesh has the lowest overall contraceptive use. Those familiar
with the family planning program suggest that regional patterns in
contraceptive use reflect a difficulty in recruiting female field workers
in the more conservative areas; in general, contraceptive prevalence
corresponds to the number of family planning posts that are filled.
Consistent with this explanation, the Chittagong region has the
highest level of vacancies and the lowest level of contraceptive use.
Table 3 demonstrates the regional variation in contraceptive use in
1993.
51. See A. NEAz & H. BANu, EFFEaT OF PROGRAMMATIC AND NoN-PROGRAMMATIC FAcTORS
ON CONTRACEPTION AND FERTn=r IN BANGiADESH (NIPORT 1992); Bernhart & Mosleh Uddin,
supra note 46.
52. See Duza, supra note 41.
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TABLE 3: REGIONAL VARIATION IN CONTRACEPTIVE USE 199353
Division Traditional Modem Any
Method Method contraception
Barisal 10.0 37.8 47.7
Chittagong 5.9 23.4 29.3
Dhaka 8.0 36.3 44.3
Khulna 12.5 42.8 55.3
Rajshahi 8.9 45.9 54.8
PROGRAMMATIC APPROACH TO RELIGIOUs OPPOSITION TO
CONTRACEPTION
Religious leaders voiced early opposition to the aggressive family
planning campaign to change attitudes towards birth control. The
most common obstacles to birth control were social ostracization,
refusal for burial, and lashings and other sentences imposed by shalish
tribunals. As the program matured, this opposition gradually faded.
It is not uncommon, however, for fear of religious reprisal to make
women unwilling to accept certain contraceptive services. For
instance, a recent trend in declining use of the IUD has been
attributed to the fear of being denied a religious burial.
The family planning program has addressed religious opposition
through educational programs for religious leaders. These programs
provide information about the need to control population growth and
the health benefits of reduced births. Additionally, there have been
some concerted efforts to motivate religious leaders to make public
pronouncements endorsing the use of family planning. For the most
part, these pronouncements are based on liberal interpretations of
the Quran that demonstrate Islam's relatively lenient position towards
the use of birth control. In 1985, in response to a request from the
Government's Planning Commission, the Islamic Foundation
published a book highlighting these liberal interpretations.
53. See Mitra et al., supra note 44.
54. SHAMSUL ALAM, ISLAM AND FAMILY PLANNING (The Islamic Foundation 1985).
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MUSLIM LAWS AND REPRODUCrIVE ISSUES
The practice of deploying progressive interpretations of Muslim laws
in support of state-sponsored family planning programs has found
favor in a number of countries other than Bangladesh. Eminent
religious leaders have issued among others these fatwas (religious
opinions):"
I see no objection from the Shariah point of view to the consider-
ation of family planning as a measure, if there is a need for it, and
if the consideration is occasioned by the people's own choice and
conviction without constraint or compulsion, in the light of their
circumstances, and on the condition that the means for effecting
this planning is legitimate."
There is agreement among the exponents of jurisprudence that
coitus interrruptus, as one of the methods for the prevention of
childbearing, is allowed. Doctors of religion inferred from this that
it is permissible to take a drug to prevent childbearing, or even to
induce abortion. We confidently rule in this fatwa that it is
permitted to take measures to limit childbearing.57
Such fatwas derive from analogy to earlier-established interpreta-
tions in favor of contraception, and, within certain limits, abortion.
Mussallam narrates how medieval jurists, in the absence of any explicit
reference to contraception in the Quran, traditionally turned for
guidance to the Hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet Muham-
mad), and quiyas (reasoning by analogy), and ijma (consensus). s
Several Hadith were cited as permitting contraception, with reference
to the practice of 'azl (coitus interruptus). He points out that the
eminent jurist A1-Ghazali asserted that coitus interruptus was
permissible, on the grounds that pregnancy had four related causes:
marriage, intercourse, emission of semen, and the arrival and settling
of semen in the womb. He argued that because these four acts were
interrelated, and that the first act, marriage, was not compulsory, its
results could similarly not be held to be compulsory. The grounds on
which contraception was considered permissible included economic,
personal, social, and medical factors.
Many jurists, however, specifically rejected sterilization as a means
of acceptable contraceptive practice, despite the absence of any
55. See, e.g., ABDEL RAHIM OMRAN, FAMILY PLANNING IN THE LEGACY OF IsLAM (1992).
56. Shaikh Hasan Mamun, Rector Al Azhar University, Egypt, 1964, cited in Zulie Sachedina,
Islam, Procreation and the Law, 16 INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 109 (1990).
57. Shaikh Abdullah Al Qaliqili, Grand Mufti, Jordan, 1964, cited in Sachedina, supra note
56, at 109.
58. B.F. MussALLAM, SEX AND Soc=lY IN ISLAM (1983).
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prohibition on sterilization in either the Quran or the Hadith. Some
jurists have pointed out that sterilization should be allowed in the
absence of any specific textual prohibition, particularly because "the
preservation of reproductive power was not one of the obligations
under Islamic Law."59 In practice, in countries with significant
Muslim populations, sterilization has been made illegal only in Iran
and Saudi Arabia and is allowed in Egypt, Tunisia, India, and
Bangladesh.
In contrast to the relatively liberal position that jurists take on the
issue of contraception, the juristic interpretation of the right to
abortion has been more limited. For every school of interpretation
except one, abortion is prohibited, except to save the mother's life,
after the ensoulment of the fetus. Ensoulment of the fetus is
considered to occur 120 days from conception. Jurists differ,
however, as to whether and when abortion is permitted prior to
ensoulment. The Hanafi school, which prevails in Bangladesh,
permits abortion with justification before ensoulment. Several
countries with a majority Muslim population have legislation
permitting abortion within the first trimester, on the grounds of
saving the woman's life,' or for reasons of maternal health," or on
any grounds whatsoever.62 Bangladesh has also clarified the existing
law (which is not based on shariat, but is part of the Colonial Penal
Code), thereby enabling widespread provision of MR services that do
not fall within the ambit of the abortion legislation.
FURTHERING REPRODUCTiVE RIGHTS?
Given the liberality and the range of interpretations of Muslim laws
on reproductive issues, any attempt to identify "a fateful triangle
model that sees an inevitably ill-fated association between Islam,
women and demographic outcomes"6' appears doomed at the outset.
Similarly, any attempt to assert a monolithic and restrictive view of the
"Islamic position" on reproductive rights would be misleading.
While the framework of Muslim laws permits the development and
operation of family planning programs, it remains unclear whether
the framework of Muslim law alone can ensure women's reproductive
rights. In contrast to other religious laws, Muslim laws are premised
59. See Sachedina, supra note 56, at 109.
60. These countries include: Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia.
61. Egypt allows abortion to protect the mother's health.
62. Tunisia allows abortion for any reason.
63. Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, Islam, Women and Politics: TheDemography of Arab Countries,
18 Pop. & DEv. REv. 50 (1992).
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on the need to encourage marriage for all members of the Muslim
faith. Muslim laws also assert that both partners in a marriage have
a right to sexual enjoyment. In spite of such provisions, however, and
while Muslim law may condone family planning, the notion that a
woman may, for her own reasons, choose to adopt a contraceptive
method is derided.' For example, the Islamic Foundation, which
elaborated the religious texts favoring family planning, also categori-
cally asserts the limits of its position, as follows:
Free distribution and easy availability of contraceptives to unmar-
ried, even married people away from families, is illegitimate. The
uncontrolled distribution of contraceptives has opened the
floodgates of adultery and fornication or adultery programme for
turning our women folk, particularly of our high class society, into
half prostitutes as in the west, and be condemned to the most
perpetual hell .... .'
More importantly, personal laws that regulate rights within marriage
in many Muslim countries establish a framework that denies women
equality and inhibits them from exercising their right to self-determi-
nation within the family. In particular, in the South Asian context, it
has been argued that the combination of men's right to polygamy or
unilateral divorce and women's lack of alternatives to marriage
restrains women from exercising the choice not to bear children.66
In this particular social and economic context, a woman's sole
safeguard may be her ability to give birth to sons.
Moreover, traditional interpretations of Quranic verses and other
sources of law tend to emphasize the inequality between men and
women. While asserting that the introduction of Islam improved the
status of women in Arabia, these traditional interpretations emphasize
that Islam sanctions gender inequalities, particularly with respect to
rights in marriage, rights to inheritance, and also establishes that one
man's evidence is equivalent to that of two women.
The failure to establish that Muslim laws or Islam are determinative
in constraining women's reproductive choices does not mean,
however, that Islam or Muslim laws and beliefs are irrelevant with
respect to reproductive issues. The powerful ideological influence of
Islam ensures its impact on reproductive choices. This prompted
certain women's rights advocates (preeminently, Riffat Hassan and
Fatima Mernissi) to adopt a strategy of attempting to reinterpret
religious texts from a human rights and feminist perspective. They
64. See Al Ghazali, cited in MUSSAu.LAM, supra note 58.
65. ALAM, supra note 54, at xix.
66. ALAM, supra note 54, at 45-46.
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argue that texts used to legitimize women's inferiority should not be
relied on outside their historical context, but instead be seen as
limited to a particular historical context, and, therefore, subject to
reinterpretation in an evolving society.
While such reformist strategies, which clearly situate themselves
within the parameters of a religion, are useful for any community,
their limitations need to be addressed. Reformist reinterpretations
are unlikely to be accepted by religious leaders, and can offer no
solutions across religious groups. A more effective strategy for
establishing women's reproductive rights would ground such rights
within an appropriate framework that takes into account, not only
Islam and Muslim laws, and their varying interpretations, but also the
specific cultural and political context of any society, and is based on
a bedrock of universal human rights standards.
THE FuNDAMENTALIST CHALLENGE
The women's reproductive rights movement has faced challenges
from all religious orthodoxies, as well as recent religious fundamental-
ist movements. Otherwise pitted against each other politically,
religious fundamentalists, of whatever hue, appear to share a common
agenda regarding the control of women's rights.
Interestingly, while Muslim fundamentalists have not directly
threatened family planning programs, they have reacted strongly to
the assertion of women's reproductive rights within the context of
such programs. In their effort to challenge the ability of women to
assert their reproductive rights, fundamentalist groups have sought to
impose a monolithic and repressive interpretation of religious laws
and religious views.
For example, Moududi, a Pakistani religious leader, and founder of
one of the leading Muslim fundamentalist parties, who was firmly
opposed to family planning, selectively cited religious texts to support
his claims that birth control was an anti-Islamic conspiracy, and that
the introduction of family planning in developing countries would
result in "the breakdown of the family and sexual promiscuity" and in
women giving up their traditional roles. 7 Rahman shows that
Moududi's attempted theological justification for such assertions
amounted to less than ten percent of his book, The Birth Control
Movement, and that such assertions were based on a less than
comprehensive reading of religious traditions.'
67. OMRAN, supra note 55, at 207.
68. See OMRAN, supra note 55, at 207.
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More recently, the Cairo Conference saw a coalition of Christian
(led by the Vatican) and Muslim fundamentalists attempting, and
succeeding in part, in restraining the affirmation and elaboration of
women's reproductive rights. Fundamentalists mounted a last minute
campaign (combining street demonstrations with shuttle diplomacy)
to persuade Heads of State to stay away from the Conference. At the
Conference itself, the coalition strongly opposed the terminology used
in the Chapter of the ICPD Programme of Action entitled Reproductive
Rights and Reproductive Health;'69 a small number of Muslim countries
also opposed the language on women's empowerment.70 While
some countries accepted the need for post-abortion counselling and
care (including Bangladesh), the Programme of Action itself stated
that no changes could be made regarding abortion law except by
national legislatures.
An indicator of how fundamentalists will take up the challenge of
Cairo domestically may be gauged by the following comments: "[W] e
do not accept the concept of a single parent family or the concept of
a family in its plurality of forms. .".."" This commentator also
appears particularly opposed to States providing reproductive health
cdre, and information on reproductive health to adolescents and
men.72 He argues that acceptance of these proposals would result
in
a society in which extra marital sex will be socially and legally
permissible. Parents will have no control over their children. This
has been prevalent in the West for the last half century and this has
led to immoral behaviour, sexual anarchy, sexually transmitted
diseases, more crimes, and more particularly sexually related
crimes.73
In a more than faint echo of Moududi, he continues: "Does the UN
Draft Programme then want to export these western social maladies
to the Eastern and Muslim countries in the name of population
control and development?" 4 In conclusion, he asserts: "As far as
Bangladesh is concerned these offending clauses of the document
offend our religious feelings, our culture and above all our civiliza-
69. For an outline of the points of opposition to ICPD Programme of Action by the
religious coalition, see Centre for Reproductive Law and Policy, The Cairo Conference, A Programme
of Actionfor Reproductive Rights?, in REPRODUCrIVE FREEDOM AT THE UN (1994).
70. See iU at 2. For example, Libya expressed a reservation to the entire chapter on Gender
Equality, Equity and Empowerment of Women to the extent that they contradict Islamic law, in
particular with reference to sexual behavior. Id.
71. Razzaq, supra note 2, at 4.
72. See Razzaq, supra note 2, at 5.
73. Razzaq, supra note 2, at 5.
74. Razzaq, supra note 2, at 6.
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tion... to agree to such a proposal would be... unconstitution-
al."7
5
Muslim fundamentalists thus deny more liberal interpretations of
Muslim laws and foreclose the possibility of any further progressive
interpretation. In seeking to impose an extremely authoritarian
version of the shariat on an entire society, fundamentalists reveal their
essentially autocratic agenda. This agenda includes attempts to
impose a monolithic set of standards and forms, as well as denial of
dissent and internal reform movements within society. In the
fundamentalist view, there is no space for any form of diversity within
society, particularly as this is reflected in the reality of women's lives
and experiences. The fundamentalist view thus seeks to impose one
identity, based on religion, for each citizen, and within that, to
impose one defined immutable role for women. Any attempt by an
individual to assert her own sovereignty or right to self-determination
is viewed as a challenge to the prevailing order. The combination of
the individual and collective demands of women for social justice,
explicitly insisting on a change in the distribution of power, may in
this context, provoke a violent response.
THE POLITICS OF FUNDAMENTALISM IN BANGLADESH
In Bangladesh, the rise of fundamentalism is connected to a history
of military dictatorships and fragile democracies, as well as extreme
dependence on economic aid.76 Autocratic regimes have used Islam
as a legitimating ideology. Similarly, democratically elected govern-
ments have asserted the need to uphold religion and religious values
and sentiments (not only for populist reasons, but also to visibly
demonstrate the maintenance of the status quo of the social order),
and have thus facilitated the growth of fundamentalist politics.
The rise of fundamentalism has accompanied the gradual
Islamization of the State. The creation of Bangladesh was a nail in
the coffin of the theory of religious nationalism. The Constitution
firmly established secularism as a Fundamental Principle of State
Policy. Over the years, however, a series of constitutional amend-
ments by two successive military governments resulted in the removal
of the principle of secularism. The principle, for example, has been
replaced by a clause enunciating "trust and faith in almighty Allah,"77
75. Razzaq, supra note 2, at 8.
76. See generally Meghna Guhathakurta, The Aid Discourse and the Politics of Gender A
Perspective from Bangladesh, 65J. Soc. STUD. (1994).
77. Proclamations Order No. 1 of 1977, repinted in 29 DHAKA L. REP. 128 (1977).
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and by the establishment of Islam as the State Religion.78 State
policies, such as the provision of government funding for madrassah
(religious schools for Muslims), the training of imams, and the
patronage extended to governmental institutions such as the Islamic
Foundation, have facilitated the ability of fundamentalists to operate.
The fundamentalists' invocation of the cry "Islam in danger" to
further their own political ends is a familiar one. TheJamaat-e-Islami,
a leading Islamic political party, which calls for an Islamic state and
the introduction of Islamic law, in particular, has raised this banner
repeatedly throughout the country's history. It did so viciously in
1971, during Bangladesh's war of independence, when leading
members of the party collaborated with the Pakistani Army and
allegedly led paramilitary groups that perpetrated mass killings, rapes,
and other atrocities.
Unable to make any significant headway through a democratic
process, theJamaat-e-Islami have played the religious card in order to
enter the political arena. They have been particularly successful in
doing so in periods of dictatorship. Banned from organizing
immediately after the independence war, the Jamaat, together with
other religious extremist parties, were able to recommence their
activities after a military coup.
The process of rehabilitation of fundamentalists in political life
essentially occurred under military regimes, which sought not only to
play the religious card to obtain popular legitimacy, but to build up
a political base. With their participation in later oppositional
movements for democracy, and currently for electoral reform, the
fundamentalists have now gained a level of legitimization. This
process, however, has been threatened by a popular movement to
hold war crimes trials in which front-ranking leaders of the Jamaat-e-
Islami have been named as potential accused. The fundamentalists'
potential rural support base has also been substantially eroded by the
development activities of NGOs, many of which are focused on
women's empowerment.
Fundamentalists have reacted by attacking all those engaged in
social change, whether progressive intellectuals, writers, or develop-
ment organizations. They have sought to justify their actions on the
basis that individual or organizational reformers threaten public and
social order. The fundamentalists' "ability to create tensions and law
78. BANGL. CONST. of 1972 art. 2A, established by Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act No.
30 of 1988, reprinted in BANGL GAzrrE ExTRAoRDINARY (1988).
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and order situations on a religious and sectarian basis" 9 has been a
significant factor in their ability to gain political concessions,
particularly in periods of political stalemate. Self-appointed guardians
of a monolithic and repressive version of Islam, the fundamentalists
have proven adept at twisting logic and extracting interpretations of
religion that suit their own immediate ends.
ATrACKS ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUcrIVE RIGHTS
It is in this context, therefore, that the attack on women's sexual
and reproductive rights has been launched. The increasing visibility
of women in both urban and rural areas, prompted by women's
employment in the garments sector and the activities of development
organizations, has acted as a catalyst for such an attack.
The fundamentalists chose as their first target single women
identified as having transgressed social norms. In a series of cases,
fatwas were issued by imams or madrassah principals, accusing women
of zina (adultery/fornication), and sentencing them to punishments
such as stoning, caning, and, in one particularly horrifying case,
burning at the stake. Three women have died in such incidents.
Other women who were accused by fatwas now face social
ostracization.
In each case, the fatwa was issued in the context of a shalish. A
centuries-old method of alternative dispute resolution, the shalish is
traditionally called upon to negotiate and mediate family or land
disputes or petty criminal matters. Its judgments are usually accepted
by both parties.
In the cases described below, shalish authorities stepped far beyond
their traditional bounds. Invariably composed of community and
religious elders, the shalish tried and convicted women for acts that do
not constitute offenses under Bangladeshi criminal law and sentenced
them to punishments that also are not provided for by the prevailing
law.
Dulali's Case8"
In one case, Dulali, age twenty-five, became pregnant during an
extra-marital relationship with Botu, another resident of her village.
On discovering her condition, her family arranged her marriage to
79. KHAWAR MUMTAZ & FARIDA SHAHEED, WOMEN OF PAKISTAN: TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE
STEP BACK 10 (1989).
80. The following account is derived from reports in DailyJonohontho from February to April
1994 and from the notes of Sara Hossain, who conducted onsite investigations in Noakhali in
February 1994.
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another man. Her husband, on confirming his suspicions that she
was pregnant, however, divorced her. Dulali's family then reportedly
called upon local elders to hold a shalish into the matter. At the
shalish, Dulali was accused of zina and sentenced to be caned 101
times, to be administered seven days after the delivery of her child.
No accusation was made against Botu, the man involved. The
execution of the sentence was preempted by the intervention of
national women's organizations and the consequent presence of the
police in the village on the day appointed for the caning. Subse-
quently, all locals denied the shalish, the fatwa, and the sentence.
Dulali is no longer able to live in the village.
Shopnahar's Case"'
In another case, Shopnahar, age thirteen, became pregnant after
she was allegedly raped by eighteen-year-old Shafiq. The incident
occurred four days after her first period. Shafiq and his family
promised that he would marry Shopnahar. They revoked this
promise, however, on discovering her pregnancy. Shopnahar's father
then called a shalish, which was presided over by the principal of a
local madrassah. At the shalish, Shopnahar insisted that she wanted to
swear an oath on the Quran that "it is Shafiq who has harmed me.
But they wouldn't listen to me."
The Moulana found that in the absence of witnesses, the allegation
against Shafiq could not be proved. Nevertheless, he found it
necessary to punish Shopnahar "because she was pregnant." The
members of the shalish sentenced Shopnahar to be caned 100 times,
to be administered forty days after the delivery of her child. On the
date scheduled for the delivery, crowds gathered outside the hospital
where Shopnahar was confined to view her "bastard child."
Shopnahar was reluctant to return to the village, fearing that the
sentence would be carried out as scheduled. In the meantime, the
police were forced to act by the efforts of women's rights and human
rights' organizations in the capital. A national women's organization
arranged for Shopnahar and her child to be given shelter in their
refuge while the case continued.
Trials by shalish, as in the above cases, are clearly illegal. Shalish
authorities have invariably invoked the shariat during these trials,
81. The following account is derived from reports in the Daily BhorerKagoj and the Daily
Ajker Kogaj in 1994 and Sara Hossain's unpublished notes from an interview with Shapnahar in
Dhaka in November 1994.
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although religious law is not applicable to criminal matters in
Bangladesh. Shalish have no jurisdiction to hold trials for zina, which
is not a criminal offence under Bangladeshi law. Although these
shalish clearly violate the fundamental right to life and personal
liberty, and the right to protection of the law, the failure of the State
to respond promptly in each case has enabled perpetrators of such
violence against women to escape with impunity."2
In both of these cases, young women were targeted by the
community, led, in particular, by religious leaders, for having
transgressed social and sexual norms. In Shopnahar's case, the shalish
refused to take note of her allegations of rape. In each case, the risk
of exposure and the lack of information combined to ensure that the
options of contraception or abortion, which could have preempted
the shalish and its ensuing consequences, were not available to either
Shopnahar or Dulali.
The focus of fundamentalist attacks shifted in their second phase
onto development organizations. Both the staff and the beneficiaries
of a number of development projects faced threats of violence and
criminal intimidation. 3 Nonformal primary education schools, in
which a large number of girls were enrolled and which provide
secular education, were burned to the ground. Women receiving
health care from NGOs were warned to boycott such organizations
and were threatened with divorce if they failed to abide by such
injunctions. Attacks continued to be targeted at sterilization
programs, with women who adopted sterilization being socially
ostracized or refused religious burial rites.
THE BACKLASH EFFECr
Religious opposition to reproductive rights, in the wake of Cairo,
has been identified as being fuelled by extremist groups and
fundamentalists. Such opposition appears to be based, not on
religious considerations, but rather on purely political considerations.
Thus, fundamentalists are unable to provide any clear or comprehen-
sive theological justifications for their position. They are compelled
82. See AIN 0 SHALISH KENDRA, REPORT ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN BANGLADESH, 1994
(forthcoming); Amnesty International, FundamentallRghts of Women Violated with Virtual Impunity,
ASA/13/09/94 (Oct. 1994); Amnesty International, Taking the Law in Their Own Hands: The
Village Shalish, ASA/13/12/93 (Oct. 1993).
83. SeeAIN o SHAuSH KENDRA, supra note 82; COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IN BANGLADESH, THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BANGLADESH, 1994 (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, ASIA REPORT (1994).
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to attempt to whip up fears of a disintegration of social and moral
order resulting from the application of reproductive rights.
Despite a steady trend of Islamization of the Bangladesh Constitu-
tion since independence, some far-reaching legislative interventions
have been made, at times wholly at odds with the position under
shariat," and judicial interpretations have in certain instances, also
interpreted shariat, wherever possible, to allow for more equitable
resolutions." In contrast, the failure to legislate in the arena of
women's reproductive rights effectively allows for the enforcement of
such rights to be determined by community bodies solely on the basis
of tradition or custom. In extreme situations, this combined with the
denial of information regarding reproductive health care and the lack
of any access to such care, can result in situations such as those facing
the fatwa victims described above.
The recent reaffirmation of reproductive rights at the Cairo
Conference, combined with the existing legal foundations in
international human rights law, as well as in the Constitution,
provides an unassailable framework for women's rights advocates to
press for the enforcement of reproductive rights and freedoms.
Specifically defining rights and elaborating their operation through
the law is of importance insofar as this establishes easily recognizable
and uniform standards to meet certain needs. The challenge for
women's rights advocates is to effectively use human rights law and
the policy pronouncements at Cairo to establish the rights to
reproductive security, health, and self-determination for Shopnahar,
Dulali, and all other women.
84. See; e.g., Bangladesh Abandoned Children (Special Provisions) Ordinance, reprinted in
24 DHAKA L. REP. 240 (1972) (permitting adoptions).
85. See Hossain, supra note 6.
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